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The last contribution to the discussion which has been
carried on for at least fifty years, as to whether an executory
contract can be enforced in rein, is the case of the
Eugene, 83 Fed. 222 (D. C., N. D. Wash.). One
Executory
Contract,
of the first cases on this point, and certainly the
Enforcement chief authority to the effect that executory conIn Rem
tracts bind the vessel, was the Paciftic, I Blatchford,
569 (j850). In that case a miner bound for California was
allowed to detain the ship with all the passengers on board,
because the ship-owners had broken their contract with him
by receiving more than the specified number of persons for
carriage. The opinion of Mr. Justice Nelson then delivered
has been referred to in every case since that time, and his
views have been endorsed or disapproved many times. It is
rather curious that, in the 1898, this same question should be
presented to the court of admiralty, and again in connection
with persons bound for the mines.
In the Eugene (supra) a libel was filed for breach of contract to carry from Seattle via. St. Michaels to Dawson City.
The Portland & Alaska Trading & Transportation Company,
claimants of the " Eugene," had issued tickets for passage on
the steamer "Bristol" from Seattle to St. Michaels, and thence
on board the steamer "Eugene" to Dawson City. The breach
alleged was the failure of the "Eugene" to go to St. Michaels
to receive the libellants as agreed. Hanford, J., reviewed the
cases and then said: "According to the authorities, it is not
the making of a contract, nor the payment of the consideration
therefor, which renders the vessel liable. The lien upon which
the right to proceed depends, does not attach until the goods
or passengers have been placed within the care and under the
control of the ship's master." Thus the learned judge sides
with the later opinions on this subject and expresses what may
now be considered the correct view.
An interesting opinion is that by Bradford, J., in the Ella,
84 Fed. 471 (D. C., D. Del). Repairs were made upon a vessel
Maritime

in a foreign port at the order of her owner, and

Liens,

a note was given by him to secure the payment

Repairs

of the charges of the materialman.

Upon the

first point the learned judge said : "The maritime law does
not recognize any lien on a vessel for repairs furnished in a
230
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foreign port, on the direct order of the owner in person, unless
there is an agreement, express or implied, for a lien.
If there be a common understanding between the repairer and
the owner that the furnishing of necessary repairs is to proceed upon the basis of a lien, or of extension of credit to the
ship as well as to the owner or master, there is an implied
contract for a lien." The opinion contains a most excellent
discussion of the principles governing the implied hypothecation of a ship. As to the second point raised by the above
facts, the court said: "The mere acceptance, by a person entitled to a maritime lien for repairs, of a promissory note of
the owner of the ship repaired, does not defeat the lien.
There is a presumption that the note is taken only as collateral security; and this presumption continues, unless it
affirmatively appears that the note was taken with an intention.
that it should extinguish the lien." This quotation has been
given because it contains such a good statement of the law.
The principle is, of course, well settled.
A libel for supplies, filed against a fleet of boats composing
a dredging plant-a tug, a dredge, several scows, water boats,
Maritime etc.-shows a peculiar train of thought in the
Liens,
mind of counsel. As stated by Benedict, J., "the
Lien on Whole theory of the libel seems to be that this fleet of
Fleet
boats should be treated as one vessel; and the
supplies in question having been bought for the fleet (although
used on some of the vessels and not on others), this gives the
libellant a lien therefor upon all the vessels jointly," Such a
proposition, it was held, could not be maintained: The Knickerbocker, 83 Fed. 843 (D. C., E. D. of N. Y.).
The same learned judge, in a case that is also very late in
being reported, The Angler, 82 Fed. 845 (Mar. 13, 1894), deM,aritime cided that a delay of two years, without good
Liens,
excuse, in bringing an action in rem, when the
Waiver
vessel has passed into the hands of a bonafde
holder, will operate as a waiver of the lien. A decision to
the same effect is to be found in the case of the Asher W.
Parker, 84 Fed. 830 (C. C. A.. 2d Cir.).
It is a familiar rule that salvors must exercise care, good
faith and absolute honesty with regard to property they save,
salvage of this being particularly so in the case of derelict
Derelict,
vessels. Therefore, while it may seem a hardship
Care
that they should have to pay for the loss of the
Required
boat which they have rescued, it is a necessary
result.

In the case of Serviss v. Ferguson et al.. 84 Fed. 202
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(C. C. A., 2d Cir.), the salvors of a derelict barge negligently
permitted her to sink in a slip to which they had towed her,
and, in their absence, they having given no notice nor placed
any buoy to mark the spot where the barge lay, she was
crushed by a vessel moving about in the slip. Brown, J.,
after deducting one-third of the value of the barge to pay for
their salvage services, held them liable for the balance. This decree was affirmed, per curiam, by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
It is a difficult task for a judge to settle satisfactorily the
value of salvage services, there are always so many facts to
be considered. It was truly observed by Judge
Salvage,
Value
Goff in a recent case (T/he Haxby), 83 Fed. 715
of Services (C. C. A., 4 th Cir.), that "it is hardly safe to make
comparison of cases of this character unless at the same time
careful attention is given, and proper discrimination made, as
to the facts and the special circumstances existing in each
case. The dissimilar facts are generally so marked, especially those relating to value, time, risk and skill, as to render
the decision in one case an unsafe guide in another."
In this case the "Haxby," a British steamship which had
stranded on the Eastern Shore of Virginia, was rescued with
comparatively little danger, in less than four days, by the use
of tugs, cables, etc., belonging to the libellant, a wrecking company. The nearness of a life-saving station and the injuries
received by the salved vessel were among the facts which influenced the court to reduce the award of the District Court
from more than one-fourth to one-sixth of the value saved.
The case of the International, 83 Fed. 840 (D. C., E. D.
Pa.), presents a novel question, it is believed. The "Inter--Vessels," national," a large steam dredge, was imported
What
from Canada and seized by the Collector of the
Constitute Port of Philadelphia as subject to duty as "goods,
wares and merchandise," under the tariff laws. The owners
brought a possessory action, and it was contended in opposition to them that, while libels in rem have been sustained for
the wages of men employed upon such dredges, those cases
are really to be supported upon the character of the services
involved, and are not anthorities for the position that a steam
dredge is a "vessel" within the meaning of the Acts of Congress. Butler, J., however, decided in favor of the libellant.
The case has been taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals and
elaborately argued. The decision of that court should furnish interesting reading.
The case of Lawrence v. Flatboat,83 Fed. 200 (D. C., S. D.
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Ala.), adds another to the list of cases which counsel in the
International (supra) will have to succeed in distinguishing,
in order to have the decree ot the District Court reversed.
It decides that a libel in rem is maintainable for the wages of
men working on a flatboat fitted with a pile driver and used
in constructing bulkheads for the erection of channel lights.
Toulonin, J., after citing seveaal cases, said: "Itseems to me
that the flatboat in this case should likewise be classed as a
vessel rendering service in aid of commerce. She was capable of being navigated, and her business required her to be
navigated from one place to another. When at work she
drove piling and constructed bulkheads for the erection of
lights to mark the channel of the bay in aid of navigation and
commerce. Dredges and scows, though never used in the
transfer of passengers or freight, and furnished with no motive.
power of their own, are vessels, and subject, as such, to maritime liens for service rendered." Counsel for the claimant
evidently saw the weak point in his case when he contended
that the service performed was not of a maritime character;
but in this position he was opposed by a long line of cases, and
his arguments were overruled.
ASSIGNMENTS.

It is a familiar principle in the law of assignments that any
instrument or instruments which contemplate the purposes
Construction, usually contemplated in an assignment shall be
Chattel
construed as an assignment, whatever legal form
In Hargadine-cmortgage the transaction may take.
Kittrick Diy Goods Co. v. Bradley, 43 S. W. (Ind. Terr.) 947,
this was applied to the case of a chattel mortgage, accompanied by an agreement or power of attorney, practically conferring upon the mortgagee the rights and duties of an assignee for -creditors. As no provision was made for complying with the law governing assignments, the transaction was
held void as against a subsequent judgment creditor of the
mortgagor.
Smitht v. Cullen, 51 Pac. (Wash.) IO4O, holds (I) that
though the law requires an assignment to be acknowledged,
knowledge of the assignment
has actualthat
whocomplain
Power of one
Assignee,
cannot
the assignment is illegal,
Cortol
and (2) that a clause permitting the assignee to
by Co,,rt
sell on credit is ineffective, because the assignee,
when once appointed, is subject to the control of the court.
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An assignment for creditors everywhere passes title of the
assigned property to the assignee, and in many states by statute the assignee is, besides, authorized to bring
Rightof
suits to set aside conveyances which are fraudAction
by Assignee ulent as against creditors. Kansas is one of
these states, and it has just been held there that the assignee
is qualified also to bring suits to set aside preferences forbidden
by law-the deduction naturally following that the creditors
have no.longer such a right of action, even though the assignee refuse to proceed, their remedy being an order of court
for him to proceed or for his removal: John Deere Plow Co. v.
-EmporiaBank, 5 1 Pac. (Kan.) 892.
ATTACHMENTS.
The only way in which a levy can be made under an attachment upon property capable of manual delivery is by the sheriff
taking possession thereof; hence where a sheriff
demanded of A the delivery of property of a
Sufficiency
of Levy
defendant in attachment, A denying his possession,
the sheriff at the same time delivering to A a certified copy of
the warrant, and a notice of his intention to levy on the
property and requiring him to deliver the same, and where later
a receiver, appointed for the defendant, took possession of the
property, an application to permit the sheriff to complete the
levy was held to be properly denied: Robinson v. Columbia
Spinning Co. (Supreme Court, App. Div.), 49 N. Y. Suppl. 4.
BANKS AND BANKING.

The too common occurence of bank failures resulting from
the disobedience by officers of the positive requirements of
statutes, renders interesting such decisions as
Dunn v. O'Connor, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 270. The
I ecovery
bank had there lent to its president more than
twenty per cent. of its capital and surplus in violation of Laws
Itwas held that the maximinpariddicto
1892, c. 689, § 25.
did not apply. and that the bank was entitled to recover the
amount of the loan and to enforce the mortgage given as
security therefor.
Independent District of Pela v. Beard,83 Fed. (D. C. Iowa)
5, contains an exhaustive summary of the conflicting decisions relative to following trust funds in the hands
of a receiver of a bank. After pointing out that
Insolvency,
Trust Funds

it is impossible to reconcile the authorities as to
the identification of a deposit of trust funds which have become
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improperly mixed with the general funds of the bank, Woolson,
D. J., relieves himself of the difficulty by deciding that the
Iowa rule, permitting the depositor to follow his fund, being a
rdle offproper',, must be followed in the United States courts.
One cannot but ask (I) is such a rule a rule of property at all,
and (2), if so, have not the United States courts wasted a large
amount of legal learning over problems which nigat fave
been decided by a mere reference to the state decisions ?
CARRIERS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Levinson et a. v.
Texas & IV. 0. Ry. CO., 43 S. W. (Tex.) 9oi, has decided
Non-Transfer- that a ticket sold by a carrier at a reduced rate
able Tickets under an agreement that the same shall not be
transferred, constitutes a binding contract, and a transferee of.
such ticket acquires no rights thereunder.
The Supreme Court of New York, in Montgomery v. Buffalo
Ry. Co., 48 N. Y. Suppl. 849, decided that a conductor is
of a railway cornPassengers, justified in enforcing the rule
Standing on pany, prohibiting passengers from standing on the
Platform,
platform against a passenger, who stated that he
Sick
was suffering from nausea, and might have to
Passenger relieve himself by vomiting, and if the passenger
refuses to comply with the rule and is ejected, he cannot
recover for damaes resulting from such ejectment, no unnecessary force having been used.
In the recent case of San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Newman,
43 S. W. 915 (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas), a drover's
pass was made out for two persons, a provision
Railroad
on the back of the pass limiting it to that number;
Tickets,
Notice of
but the agent of the company, at the request of
Conditions
the parties, inserted the name of a third person,
informing them that all three might travel on the pass. The
conductor of the train, on which the parties sought to ride,
refused to allow passage to more than two, and was informed
which two persons were in charge of the stock. One of these
two " drew straws" with the third person to determine which
one of them should ride, and, on losing, was ejected by the
conductor. It was not shown that he had read, or knew of
the limitation on the back of the pass. Held, (i) that he was
not bound by such limitation ; (2) that he did not forfeit his
right to ride by the drawing, and that the company was liable
for his ejection.
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The Circuit Court of West Virginia, in Butler v. White, 83
Fed. 578, has recently decided (i) that the Act of Congress,
known as the " Civil Service Act" is constituCivn Service tional; (2) that by rule 3,
Act,
Who are

§ i, the internal rev-

enue service has been placed under said act and

the rules made in pursuance thereof; (3) that
gaugers and storekeepers in a distillery are officers of the government in the internal
revenue
service, and cannot be removed from their positions except
for causes other than political; (4) that any attempt to change
the positions and rank of these officers is in violation of law;
(6) that a court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain the appointing power from removing these officers from their positions, if such removals are in violation of the Civil Service
Act.
A state statute forbidding the employment of women in any
saloon, beer hall, bar-room, theatre, or other place of amuseOfficers,
Equity

Jurisdiction

Fourteenth
Amendment,

ment where intoxicating liquors are sold as a bev-

erage, does not abridge the privileges and immu-

Employment nities of citizens, or deny to all the equal protection

of Women

of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: In re
Considene (Circuit Court of Washington), 83 Fed. 157.
A state statute providing that, on the making of an assignment by a debtor within ten days after the levy of an attachObligation

of Contracts

ment, the attachment and levy shall be dissolved
and the property attached or levied shall be

turned over to the assignee, impairs the obligation
of contracts as applied to an attachment founded on an indebtedness contracted prior to the passage of the act, and is,
therefore, unconstitutional : Heath & illigan Manuf'g Co. v.
Union Oil & Paint Co. (Circuit Court Wisconsin), 83 Fed.
776.
CONTRACTS.

An agreement was made between A and B, whereby B
agreed to go into another state and locate placer mines, A
to pay expenses and such expenditures as were
Consideration, essential in making the locations.
Sufficiency

After B had

been at work some time he wrote to A that if they
were dissatisfied with his progress he would return the full
amount advanced. Held, that there was no consideration to
support this promise and that A could not recover thereon:
Tamplin v. Hobson (Court of Appeals of Colorado), 51 Pac. ioI9.
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The Supreme Court of California has decided that a contract by a divorced husband to restore a daughter to the
Personal
mother when she should reach the age of 18
Liberty
years (that being the age at which a female attains
majority), is.void as infringing her personal liberty: Ditrinh
v. Gobey et al., 5 1 Pac. o62.
The city of Portland having advertised for bids to construct
a pipe line by which the city was to be supplied with water,
Public' Policy A and B entered into an agreement by which A
Restraint of bid for various parts of the work in the name of
Competition A & Co. B, with the knowledge and concurrence of A, made separate bids in the name of B & Co. They
agreed in advance upon what parts of the work they should
bid, upon what their respective bids should be, and upon
what portion the bid of A & Co. should be the cheapest, and
so arranged matters that the highest bid, as between themselves, should, if possible, be accepted, and they would divide
the profits of the contract. The contract was awarded to A
& Co. In a suit by B & Co. to recover its share of the profits
from A & Co., the court held, reversing the court below, that
the agreement tended to restrain the natural rivalry and competition of the companies in bidding for public work, and was
against public policy and void: Hoffman v. McMullen (Circuit Court of Appeals. Ninth Circuit), 83 Fed. 372.
CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of New York, in fit re Directors-of
YEelgffilg Brewinig Co., 49 N. Y. Suppl. 12, decided that unAbatement of less provision is made by statute the common law
rule prevails, and an action for personal injuries
Action,
Dissolution does not survive the dissolution of the corporati,)n, and the court cannot authorize the continuance of the
action against the receiver.
These are days in which many frauds are committed by
bank officials upon their institutions and, through them, upon
Borrowing the depositors and the public. There is therefore
Powers of an especial interest attaching to decisions bearing
VicePresident upon the powers and liabilities of such officers.
of Bank,
Knowledge of

In Armstrong v. CGhemical Nat'lBank,83 Fed. 556,
Directors the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, has
rendered an interesting decision to the effect that a vice president binds his bank for a loan negotiated in its name but used

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CORPORATIONS (Continued).

for his own purposes with the knowledge of a minority and
through the supineness of a majority of the board of directors.
The directors in Cincinnati committed to their executive
officers authority to conduct business with a New York correspondent were treated as bound by the usage which in New
York invests such officers with apparent authority to borrow.
Such a usage the court thought not unlawful under the decision in Western Nat'lBank v.Armstrong, 152 U. S. 346(1893),
inasmuch as that decision was predicated upon an absence of
special authority while here the usage assumed the conferring
of such authority.
The New York Court of Appeals has at different times
declared that the capital of a foreign corporation employed
Franchise within the state is represented by the actual value
of its property within the state, whether in money
Tax,
"Capital
Within the

or goods or other tangible things, less the amount
which may be deemed income or profits. Upon

Insolvency,

is still enunciated from time to time by the state
courts as an existing and useful doctrine, though

State"

this principle it was decided by
the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, in People ex rel., etc., v. Roberts, Comptroller,
49 N. Y. Supp]. IO, that an Iowa corporation was subject to
a franchise tax under the Act of 1896, c. 908, §182, in respect
of securities sent to its New York office for sale, the proceeds
being returned to its offices in other states for reinvestment.
The court accordingly took into consideration the corporation's
bank account, the amount paid nut for salaries and rentals
and the average amount of securities held and used in the
state: People v. Roberts, 154 N. Y. (1 897), was distinguished.
In spite of the limitations recently placed by the United
States Supreme Court upon its favorite trust fund theory, this
Trust Funds

with perhaps an increasing tendency to restrict its
operation and effect. In its palmiest days and among its
avowed supporters it has always been a doubtful question
whether the doctrine forbids a corporation to prefer its creditors by judgment or mortgages when on the verge of insolvency. In Farwell Co. v. Sweetzer, 51 Pac. (Col.) 1012, such
preference was held valid, the court holding that the theory
only applies as between creditors and stockholders, and does
not prevent a corporation, like a private individual, from paying which of his creditors he chooses. Thus construed, the
trust fund theory seems to retain little of its original force and
vitality.
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The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Tomb/c,- v. Palestine Ice CO., 43 S. W. 896, has definitely approved of the rule
which gives to an unregistered pledgee of stock
Pledgee of
Stock,
priority over a subsequent attaching creditor of
Attachment the pledgor.
Earlier Texas decisions, beginning
with Strangev. Raih-oad C0., 53 Tex. 162 (188o), had tended in
the same direction,and this jurisdiction may now be looked upon
as in line with Pennsylvania, New Jersey. New York, South
Carolina, Kentucky, Minnesota, Louisiana and the Federal
Courts. The conclusion reached by the court is undoubtedly
sound. The endorsement and delivery of the stock certificate
operates as an equitable assignment of the shares, and, a; the
attaching creditor is not a purchaser for value, he takes in
subordination to the equities of the assignee. See "The
Compulsory Duplication of Stock Certificates," by E. A.Har-.
riman, 36 Am. Law Reg. & Rev. (N. S.) 8 1; Cook on Stock
and Stockh., § 487; " The Creation and Transfer of Shares in
Incorporated Joint Stock Companies," by C. C. Langdell, I I
Harv. Law Rev. 536.
DAMAGES.

The doctrine that damages may be recovered for mental
pain and anguish caused by negligent omission to deliver a
Mental
telegram, unaccompanied by physical injury, which
Anguish
has been adopted in Texas, Kentutcky North
Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama and several other statcs, has
been repudiated in Peay v. J14's/crn Union Tel. Co. (Supreme
Court of Arkansas), 43 S. W. 965. (See note in this issue,)
EyIDENCE.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State v. Washi;,glon,
22 So. 841, decided that in an indictment for rape the proseCompetency cutrix, a mulattress of seven years of age, was
of vitr.ess, incompetent as a witness, since it appeared upon
Ignaorance
her voir dire examination that " she has no

knowledge of God, 'never heard of the devil or the bad
man or what should become of her if she told a lie' and
had no knowledge of an oath." It was contended that a
statute declaring that "in criminal prosecutions the competent
witness is a person of proper understanding" had removed the
common law requisites, but the contention was not sustained.
In Wolfv. DiLorenzo, 49 N.Y. Suppl. 191, the question in
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dispute was an item of $17.50 which did not appear in the
written lease from an installment dealer in furniParol
ture to his purchaser. At the time of the sale
Evidence,
and the execution of the lease the dealer drew up
Written
Contract,
a memorandum of the transaction which he gave
Res Gestm
to the purchaser. This contained the item in
question but the dealer objected to it as evidence since the
transaction was contained in the written lease. Held, that the
memorandum was admissible against the dealer as part of the
res Zestae.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for E. D. Wisconsin, in Godkin v. Monalan, 83 Fed. i16, has expressly
differed from the decision of U. S. C. C. of ApEvidence to peals for E. D. of Pa. upon the rule of law stated
Vary Terms and applied by the latter court in The Pokonoket,
of Written 28 U. S. App. 6oo (1895), a case which attracted
Contract,
In
Admissability some attention at the time it was decided.
the "Pokonoket" a written agreement provided for
the purchase of a vessel, to be paid for as the construction
progressed, without any provision as to when title was to pass.
The builder failed, and his interest in the vessel was sold, with
full notice of respondent's claim, to the libellant, who attempted to recover the unfinished vessel from the purchaser.
The latter, to maintain his title, offered to prove that, during
the negotiation prior to the making of the written contract,
it was agreed that title should pass to the purchaser at once,
and that, in consequence of this agreement, the security for
completion given by the builder should be $25,000 instead of
This evidence was admitted by the trial judge, and
$50,000
was absolutely uncontradicted. The court state the law to be
that, in the absence of parol evidence, the contract would tinquestionably be construed as leaving the title in the builder,
and bases its ruling as to the evidence upon a number of
Pennsylvania decisions, which fully sustain the position, and
admit the evidence (i) because the testimony did not contradict the written contract, but was entirely consistent therewith,
and treated of a collateral matter not covered thereby-in
other words, the writing did not contain the whole agreement;
(2) because under the circumstances of this case it would be
a fraud upon the rights of the purchaser to allow the libellant, standing in the shoes of the builder, to evade the agreement in this manner. Upon appeal the judgment was sustained upon the authorities cited, with the addition of several
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other English and American decisions. This case is attacked in the Appellate Court of the Wisconsin Circuit as
unsound, when, after ruling that where such a contract is silent
as to title-by the law in this country title is in the buildersit " held that the parol agreement, with respect to the title,
was collateral and independent, and could be given in evidence." The lower court admitted the evidence upon the
rulings of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, whiclir court
has gone to an extreme in the admission of evidence to vary
written agreements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decree upon the strength of those decisions, and of certain
other cases cited, notably certain English cases, which are reviewed and disapproved in Naumberg v. Yo71ng, 44 N. J. Law,
331 (1882).

The law as it existed when the contract was

signed was an integral part of the contract, and it could not.
have been altered as to this term by subsequent legislation.
They therefore maintain that the law annexed a term to the
contract which could not be contradicted by parol evidence,
citing Van Winkle v. Cowell, 146 U. S. 42 (1892).
Having thus repudiated the ruling in "The Pokonoket," they
apply the strict ruling to the contract then before them. The
plaintiff had contracted with the defendant " to cut and deliver in the Wisconsin river all . . . pine timber
on N. Y2 sec. 31 . . . to cut and skid all . .

.
.

.
tim-

ber, and to have all logs banked on the Twin river on or before 20 Mch., 1893." The question of evidence which arose
was whether the plaintiff could prove that the defendant had
agreed to obtain the banking place upon the Twin river. The
trial judge had admitted the testimony and left it to the jury
to find who had agreed to furnish the banking place, and for
this reason the judgment was reversed, the court saying at
page 121 : "The law implies, as a term of the conti :t, that
he (plaintiff) was to do all things needful to complete delivery
in the Wisconsin river; and such banking being necessary in
the progress of delivery, it became a term of the contract that
he should supply the means of banking the logs."
The decisions in these two cases from courts of equal authority seem to be diametrically opposed in principle. "The
Pokonoket," to be sure, is a stronger case, and presents a case
of greater hardship; but, had the other ruling been adopted,
the evidence would never have been admitted, and the extent
of hardship or constructive fraud never could have been
brought to light. It may be, however, that the Pennsylvania
doctrine admitting such evidence, which has been fostered and
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developed in courts administering the doctrines of equity in all
proceedings, is sound when applied in an admiralty proceeding, and unsound when applied in a suit at common law in a
Federal court, such as Godki v. Mfona/han.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The peculiarity of community property, like that of partnership property which it resembles in so many particulars, is
that it is a fund primarily liable for the payment
Community
Property,
of
debts of
It follows
thatrights
one
Separate
member
of the
the community.
community can
assert no
against it, until all community debts are paid.
So decided in Gkent v. Boyd, 43 S. W. (Tex.) 891, where the
wife, who in divorce proceedings had obtained a money decree
against her husband for using an excess of his half of the
community property, was postponed as to that property to a
subsequent judgment creditor of the community.
While it is perfectly well settled that the status of marriage
cannot be annulled by reason of ordinary misrepresentations
Debts

Marriage,

Annulment
for Fraud

which might afford ground fir setting aside an
ordinary contract, yet modern authorities are more
and more coming to a recognition of the fact that

fraud with respect to the essentials of marriage is ground for
annulling the same. Just what constitutes such fraud is not
easy to define. Riynho1s v. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 605 (i86 i), is the
forerunner of several decisions that the concealment by a woman
at marriage of the fact that she is at the time pregnant by
another man than her husband is such ground. An Ananyinouts Cc:se, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 331, suggests that the principle
may be carried a step further: The referee there reported in
favor of an annulment because the man had prior to marriage
represented to the womafi that he was in good physical health,
whereas he knew at the time that he was afflicted with a
chronic and contagious venereal disease.
Deane v. Aveling, I Rob. Ecc. 279 (1845), is usually cited as
authority for the proposition that it is capacity for copulation
and not of procreation that the law regards. The
Marriage,
Annulment reasoning, however, is not satisfactory, and we are
for Impotency disposed to agree rather with the decision in

Wendel v. Wendel, 49 N. Y. Suppl. 375, where a husband
was held entitled to an annulment for the reason that his
wife, by reason of a surgical operation, had been rendered
incapable of bearing children.

PROGRESS ,OF THE LAW.

INSOLVENCY.

Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235 (1878), and its successors,
have established beyond dispute the rule that, upon sale of an
insol,vent railroad's property,, certain 'claims may
Receiver,
Preferences be paid ,out of the fund in preference to the first
mortgage debt. The difficulty is to determine
just ,what character .of claims are entitled to this preference,
and just ,when they must have been contracted. .Nelw York
Guaranty Co. v. Tacoma Railway Co., 83 Fed. 365, is an authority upon both these points. It was there held that a cable,
being neeessary to keep a cable road up as a going concern,
was entitled to preference, though no diversion of income was
proved; and further, the now discarded six months' rule being
abandoned, a lapse of two years between the date of sale and
appointment of a receiver was held not to bar the ,claim.
MORTGAGES.

.Durhain v. Rwy. Co., i Wall. 254 (1863), is, perhaps, the
earliest case in which it is pointed out that, whereas a railroad
company may, with reference to its rolling stock
Ppertay
and moveable personalty generally, by means of
car trusts, conditional sales or otherwise, create
liens in favor of the vendors superior to that of a bondholder
secured by a mortgage containing the usual after-acquired
property clause, yet so far as its necessary real estate, as stations, tracks, etc., are concerned, no claim of the builders can
rise higher than that of creditors thus secured. Plienix Iron
Works Co. v. New York Seatrio' and Tnist Co., 83 Fed. 757,
reiterates this rule, applying it to machinery which constituted
the steam plant and motive power of a street railroad.
The disposition of the courts is increasingly against holding
a purchaser personally liable for an existing mortgage debt,
Assumption
except upon very clear evidence that he intended
by Purchaser to assume the same. So in Ordway v. Donney,
51 Pac. (Wash.) 1047, while admitting parol evidence of its
assumption, the Supreme Court reversed the court below for
finding in favor of the assumption simply upon the unconfirmed and contradictory evidence of the parties.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

An act of legislature conferring upon a city the power "to
borrow money upon the faith and credit of the city" does not
Authority to confer any' power to issue negotiable bonds; and
Issue Bonds bonds issued under supposed authority of such
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act are void in the hands of bona fide holders: Lehman v.
City of San Diego (Circuit Court of Appeals), 83 Fed. 669.
It seems to be moderately well settled that a creditor of a
municipal corporation cannot split up his claim by assigning
portions of it to different persons. This survival
Municipal of "the rule in Mandeville v. Welch" (5 Wheat.
Corporation,

Creditor's Bill 277, 1820), is said to rest upon considerations of

convenience from the point of view of a municipality
as a public agency. See Appeals of City of Plila., 86 Pa. 179
(1878). Upon a similar principle it is held that a municipal
corporation is not liable to the process of garnishment: MerwVin
v. Chicago, 45 Ill. 134 (1867). The Supreme Court of Illinois,
after citing all the garnishment cases, has extended the rule so
as to exempt a municipality from suit by creditor's bill, in
which the end sought to be attained is substantially the same'
as garnishment: Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. Chicago, 48
N. E. 967.
NEGLIGENCE.

The United States Circuit Court, in French Republic v.
World's Columbian Exposition, 83 Fed. io9, decided that the
management of a world's fair must use the highest
Duty of a
World's Fair intelligence and protection in guarding the exhibits
Company
of the other nations they invite to participate in

the enterprise. This duty continues after the close of the
fair, until the exhibitors have had a reasonable opportunity to
remove their wares, and this duty cannot be avoided by promulgating regulations, that the exposition company will not
be responsible for loss or damage. The fair company, after
the fair closed, failed to keep water at hand whereby the
buildings could be water-soaked, and consequently when the
fire broke out the French exhibits were damaged before the
fire was gotten under control, for which the fair company was
held responsible.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Dumas v. H., K.
& T. Ry. CO., 43 S. W. 9o8, decided that where a woman
attempted to raise the car window, and failed, and
Fellow
Passengers
a fellow passenger of his own motion raised it for
her, but not far enough to reach the catch, whereby it fell upon
her hand, which she had placed upon the sill without looking
to see how far the window was raised, cannot recover from
the company, as it was not liable for the passenger's act.
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A very far-fetched claim and one which was rightly dismissed was that presented in the case of The Ancharia,
83 Fed. 847 (C. C. A., 2d Cir.). The followFSteamship,
Injury to
ing statement of facts by the district judge was
Passenger,
quoted by Shipman, circuit judge, in delivering the
Remote Cause opinion of the court: " On the evening of September 22, 1894, about 8 o'clock, the libellant's son, about three
years of age, a passenger, with his father and mother, on
board the steamer "Anchoria," from Londonderry to this port,
while sitting on the starboard side of the starboard table in the
steerage, near the forward end, at his evening meal, was
scalded upon the face and neck by the splashing of hot gruel
from the bucket in which the steward was supplying it to the
steerage passengers." The cause of the accident was not
exactly clear, but the evidence went to prove that the steward
slipped upon a wet place on the floor, resulting from the
passengers' careless use of the water cooler. This was held
to be a danger so remote as not to be evidence of negligence,
-a reasonable disposition of the case.
A railroad company owned a warehouse, in which it kept
the property of its patrons. for a reasonable time until it
Powder Car in should be called for. The company allowed a car
Warehouse marked powder-which was, in fact, empty, but
locked-to be placed in close proximity thereto. The warehouse caught fire and was destroyed, because the firemen
were prevented, through reasonable fear of the powder car,
from extinguishing the fire. On this state of facts the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hardman v. Montana
Union Ry. Co., 83 Fed. 88, decided that the company was
liable to the owner of goods which were destroyed in the
warehouse.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

In Fielding& Co. v. Corry [1898], I Q. B. 268, the Court
of Appeal in England has decided an interesting question as
to what constitutes due notice of the dishonor of
Bill of
Exchange, a bill to an indorser so as to prevent a discharge
of a prior indorser upon the ground that there has
been a prior breach by any one of the parties
Endorser
required to give notice.
(See Turner v. Leech,
4 B. & Aid. 45 1 (182 1); Etting"v."The Schuylkill Bank, 2 Pa.
355 (1845).) Mr. Justice Smith stated the facts as follows:
"The plaintiffs had a bill of exchange, which they handed
Dishonor,
Due Notice to

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

NEGOTIABLB INSTRUMENTS (Continued).

to the Cardiff branch of the County of Gloucester Bank, which
is a banking company having branches at different places.
The Cardiff branch sent the bill to their London agents, the
London and Westminster Bank, by whom it was presented .
for payment in London on Saturday, November io,1894, and
it came back into their hands in the afternoon, so that they
had until Monday, November I2th, to give notice of dishonor,
and on that day they sent notice. By mistake that notice was
sent to the Cirencester branch of the County of Gloucester
Bank, and not to the Cardiff branch. On the morning of
Tuesday, November I3 th, the London bankers had discovered
the mistake, and they telegraphed to the Cardiff branch, giving
them notice that the bill was dishonored. What happened
after this was that due notice was given in succession by the
Cardiff branch, and then all the way down the line of indorserstill the defendant, who now appeals, was reached, though she
got notice of dishonor in due time."
Justices Smith and Rigly held that the written notice sent
to the Cirencester branch was a mistake in the address of the
bank, which mistake was rectified by the telegram on the I 3 th.
Mr. Justice Collins dissented upon the ground that, for the
purpose of giving and receiving fiotice of dishonor, the different
branches of a bank are treated as different persons (Clode v.
BayleY, 12 M. & W. 5 1, 1844), and therefore the delay in
notifying the Cardiff branch was not helped by the notice sent
to the Cirencester branch.
It is submitted, in reference to the opinion of Mr. Justice
Collins, that the case of Clode v. Baylcy (sitpra) only decides
that when the bill is forwarded for collection through different
branches, then each branch is considered a separate indorser
and entitled to due notice.
PARTNERSHIP.

A partner is liable to firm creditors, both as respects the
firm estate and his separate estate. For the relief of his separate estate he has a legal right to compel the
Partner'
appropriation of firm property to the payment of
Transfer by firm debts. The sequestration of this right in the
Firm
interest of firm creditors results in the creation of
to Remaining
a joint estate, to which such creditors have a legal
Partner
right of prior recourse. "The partner has more
than an equity and the firm creditor more than a lien."
Hence, if firm property is given away without consideration,
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the firm creditor may, if the firm is insolvent, set the transfer
aside. The covenant of a remaining partner to pay the firm
debts is not a valuable consideration if he is insolvent, and
the result is not affected by the circumstance that tde parties
act in good faith in the belief that they are solvent. This
sound conclusion (differing from Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush.
553, 185 2), is reached by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Franklin Sugar Ref'g Co. v. Henderson, 38 Atl. 991. Unfortunately, however, the court seems to adhere to the untenable position that the "partner's equity" is founded upon an
interest instead of a liability.
A sues B, C and D as partners to recover a firm debt. B
and C seek to escape unlimited liability by setting up a statuAssumptionof tory partnership agreement whereby B and C
Firm Debt by became special partners of D, the general partner.

Successor As to B, however, it appears that the articles were
Corporation subscribed by an attorney-in-fact, whose authority

to act for B is not shown. Under such circumstances B cannot
avail himself of the statutory limitation. But B also contcnds
that the firm subsequently became incorporated, that the corporation assumed the debts of the firm and that A has proved
for his debt in the insolvency of the corporation and has
received a dividend. A, however, is not bound by the corporation's assumption without an assent, express or implied.
Mere proof of claim and receipt of partial payment is not
conclusive. Whether there has been a discharge of the firm
by a is a question for the jury. Such is the undoubtedly
sound decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Walker v.
Wood, 48 N. E. 919.
QUASI-CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of New York, in Gill& v. Grant,49 N.
Y. Suppl. 78, has permitted a recovery of money paid to a
receiver under a mistake of law, upon the ground
Mloney
Paid Under that a receiver is an officer of the court; and,
mistake,
therefore, the general rule forbidding a recovery
Recovery,
Mistake of for money paid under a mistake of law has no apLaw
plication. Such was the doctrine of E pare
James, 9 Ch. App. 6o9 (1874), where the money was paid to
a trustee in bankruptcy; for, in the opinion of Lord Justice
James, "the Court of Bankruptcy ought to be as honest as
other people, and should set an example to the world by paying it to the person really entitled to it." See also Exparte
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Simmonds, i6 Q. B. Div. 308 (1885).
Should not a court of
law set the most practical lesson of all, viz., abolishing the
distinction between money paid under a mistake of law and a
mistake of fact, and permit a recovery where it is the duty of
the defendant to make restitution? The Supreme Court of
the United States has affirmed the right of a chancellor to
cancel or reform an instrument, executed under a mistake of
law, when in his opinion it is equitable to do so: Griswold v.
Hazard, 141 U. S. 274 (189o). The test thereof is not stated
in the opinion.
REAL4 PROPERTY.
The question of covenants running with the land recently
arose in an interesting case decided by the U. S. Circuit Court
Covenant of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. Defendants, a paper.
Running with manufacturing company, leased their land to one
Land,
F, with privilege of purchase by him within a stipLease,

Assignment,
Assignee's
Liabilty

ulated time, when they were to "convey to him by
a good and sufficient warranty deed." F covenanted in the lease that he would not carry on

the business of paper making for twenty years. He afterwards
assigned all his interest to plaintiffs, and defendants agreed to
the assignment in writing. Then plaintiffs tendered the purchase money to defendants and demanded a deed of conveyance, but they were met by a refusal unless they would agree
to a stipulation relative to the manufacture of paper on the
premises, similar to that contained in the lease to F.
Thisaction was brought for the breach of covenant to convey.
The court easily disposed of the objection that this was a
contract in restraint of trade, since the restraint was but partial both as to place and time, in which case such a condition
will be upheld. The main argument of plaintiffs was that the
stipulation in the original lease to F did not bind them, since
it did not mention the assignees of F; but the court held that
the covenant ran with the land, and that the plaintiffs could
not escape its burden.
" The restriction is, therefore, not upon F personally, but
upon the property . . . . That ' assigns' is not used in
the words of this covenant is not of moment. It is well settled, by the weight of authority, that a covenant by a lessee
against the use of the premises in a particular way, or in a
particular trade, attaches to the subject of the demise and runs
with the leasehold, whether the assignee be named or not.
The covenant concerned a thing in esse and related to the use
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of the demised premises, and is, therefore, not collateral to
the land. It did not relate to something which was not 'in
being at the time,' and clearly falls within the first and sixth
resolutions of Spencer's Case, 5 Co. I6 (I 583); Am. Strawboard Co. v. HacidatPapec Co., 83 Fed. 619."
The Circuit Court of Appeals of Nebraska, in the case of
Rey'nolds v. AManhattan Trust Co., 83 Fed. 593, has decided
that a mechanics' Jien is not discharged by a
Mechanics'
Lien, , receipt given for subscriptions of stock, the conDischarge tract for the transfer of which had at the time
become impossible to perform. The paintiffs had entered into
a contract with the Wyoming Pacific Improvement Company
for the construction of a portion of a railroad. Of the debt
thereby created a balance of $13,500 was due to the plaintiffs,
to secure which a lien had been recorded against the portions
of the road completed by them. The plaintiffs were induced
to give a receipt for the amount of the lien by promises of the
Improvement Company to give in payment certain subscriptions of stock and bonds of the Nebraska and Western Railway
Company.
Meanwhile the Improvement Company had
become insolvent, so that its stock and its promises were alike
worthless, and it had disabled itself from performance of the
subscription contract by pledging all the railway bonds it was
entitled to receive to secure advances it could never repay.
The court were of opinion that this act of the Improvement
Company was in itself a repudiation of the subscription
contract, and it had already given to the plaintiffs the right to
accept this action as a rescission of the contract.

